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Prologue
I lived in Guangzhou, China, until I graduated from high school. After that, I started
my four-year undergraduate journey at Lawrence University, WI, in the United States. This is
also my first study abroad experience. As an international student who is interested in politics
in both the United States and China, during my undergraduate years, I took a series of courses
concerning the politics and history of both countries, such as Comparative Politics and Western
Encounters with China, and I decided on my majors in Government (International Relations
Track) and East Asian Studies. When I was reading and researching any topics related to
contemporary politics, I found that Western scholarship often holds a pessimistic attitude
towards China's future and its rise as a great power in the international system due to its
authoritarian regime and rules. After 2018, the rubs and conflicts between the US and China
have become incrementally tenser because of the trade war. During the pandemic, the
competition and confrontation between these two countries are fiercer than ever before because
China is likely to replace the US as a hard-power hegemon in the world due to its existing
military capability and the help of its impressive accomplishment in handling the pandemic. I
think the Western world still has a series of misconceptions about China, including its politics,
foreign policies, and agendas toward the rest of the world. As a student who has lived in both
countries for years, I sincerely want to resolve these misconceptions and examine a "real
China" in the international system from a holistic and objective perspective in my
undergraduate thesis in International Relations.
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To both countries where I lived and studied for in significant periods of my life.

3

Abstract
In this research paper, I will explore the possibilities of China's peaceful rise and
evaluate emerging China in the international system in the contemporary world. The research
questions are grounded in what explains China's rise and how we should evaluate China as a
great power, particularly in the post-pandemic time. Mainly, I will pursue this examination
using two theories—neo-realism and neo-liberalism—and argue that China's peaceful rise is
more likely to happen via the use of soft power as China employs extensive soft-power
strategies based on its traditional Chinese cultural idea of harmony and the utilization of state
media as a mechanism for communication to respond to the United States' containment,
especially during the post-pandemic period. With a specific focus on the integration of primary
sources and second-level analyses, this research closely examines China's survival competition
and security dilemma with the US and its surrounding countries through a neo-realist
perspective and elaborates on China's exertion of cultural attractions, the applicability of
economic interdependence and temptation, and China's management of the global pandemic
via a neo-liberal approach in comparison with the US, which suggests a high likelihood of
China's peaceful rise in international politics in the future.
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I. Introduction
In our contemporary world, the relationship between the United States and China has
been capricious and paradoxical, yet intriguing. Since Dr. Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing in
1971, the US and China have retained a smooth and constructive relationship in general despite
occasional political setbacks, such as the diplomatic crisis after the NATO bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999. Particularly during recent years, the tension between
the United States and China, the two most important states in the world right now, has increased
dramatically since the trade war started in 2018. Many commentators are saying that currently,
there is a reoccurrence of the cold war between the US and USSR from 1945 through 1990.
The US, for its part, is pushing China down strongly through a variety of economic and
technological sanctions, such as increasing the tariffs on China and initiating a ban on Chinese
social media applications, including Tik-Tok and WeChat (Bradsher 2020; Paul 2020;
Swanson and Kang 2020). In essence, as a status-quo power in international politics, the US
faces a challenge from a rising China and is trying both incremental and radical strategies to
stifle the regional or even global emergence of China (Dollar and Hass 2021).
More importantly, under the impact of the pandemic in 2020, the conditions in China
are becoming more complex than before. In 2018, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enacted
changes to the country's constitution that led to the termination of ten-year presidential term
limits. This dramatic political event ignited an unprecedented level of uncertainty and unrest
concerning China's potential instability and the possible regime stagnation, which might
accelerate the ossification in bureaucracy and incrementally undercut the CCP's management
of internal affairs in the following decades. Moreover, the challenge from China to the US has
become more acute since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, in a remarkable
response to the global pandemic throughout 2020, China has revealed its strong economic
5

resistance and governance in handling the pandemic, which suggests its vast potential to rise
in an international political platform. This contradiction in China's politics—presidential term
limits removal—in recent years makes the issue of China's rise in international politics opaque
and difficult to understand.
As an indispensable actor in the Asian-Pacific area, China plays a significant role in
influencing regional peace, ecopolitical relations with surrounding countries, and the balance
of power in the world. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore the likelihood of China emerging
peacefully as a rising power in international politics, challenging the United States, the most
crucial status-quo state of the contemporary world. Otherwise, a conflictual rise of China would
lead to a conflict somewhere, and possibly even a nuclear war, which might be detrimental to
regional as well as to international security.
In this research paper, I will compare different explanations of the possibilities of
China's rise and evaluate China's emergence as a great power in the post-pandemic era. This
research paper considers three primary research questions: 1) How should China's rise be
characterized; 2) What explains China's rapid rise; and 3) How should China's great power
status be evaluated, especially in the post-pandemic period? Mainly, I will pursue my analysis
using two theories—neo-realism and neo-liberalism—and argue that China's rise does not only
depend on traditional, military sources of power but entails the extensive use of soft power, as
China employs a number of soft-power strategies to respond to the US's containment,
especially during the post-pandemic period. This paper first discusses the question of how to
characterize China's rise as a great power. It elucidates the question of whether China's rise fits
into the conflictual scenario depicted by neo-realists, where China is engaged in both a struggle
for survival and a security dilemma with the US and surrounding countries. In regard to the
second research question, my argument goes beyond the neo-realist characterization of the USChina competition as one based on military and strategic questions. Instead, the paper considers
6

the insights of a neo-liberal approach and adds a discussion of the importance of a Chinese
cultural understanding of harmony and its contemporary applications in Chinese political
policies in terms of economics and diplomacy. Notably, the Chinese understanding of harmony
in current Chinese political agendas, which political scientists often omit, is the original part
of my argument highlighting China's distinct soft-power dynamics, which account for its rapid
rise. Additionally, to address the third research question, this paper elaborates on the
applicability of China's cultural discourses via Chinese media mechanisms, economic
interdependence and temptations to other states, and China's crisis management of the global
pandemic. Particularly, China leverages edges on domestic governance in handling the global
pandemic and promoting soft-power influence via so-called "mask diplomacy" in comparison
with the US, which suggests a high potential likelihood of China's peaceful rise in international
politics.

II. Methodology
This research project is a qualitative case study resting on theoretical analysis combined
with primary and secondary source research through a post-positivist approach. The postpositivist approach perceives reality objectively and critically maintains that some phenomena
are governed "at best by probabilistic laws" compared to causal laws (Della Porta and Keating
2008, 24). The post-positivists put emphasis on possible influence stemming from the theories
and values of researchers throughout the reasoning process. Here, this research will consider
both neo-realist and neo-liberal political theories in-depth to examine the contemporary issue
of why China is rising in the international political platform as well as the politics and history
of China. In addition, an interpretivist approach with the techniques of a case study will also
be utilized to explore the political and economic development of China since the 1980s under
its distinct historical and cultural background.
7

The first principal component of my research is illustrating the reality of China's
emerging position in the global balance of power through neo-realist and neo-liberal theoretical
schools. This part builds on the review of the theories from these two schools, including the
security dilemma, economic interdependence theory, and other cultural soft power sources, to
demonstrate the reality and complications of China's emergence. It reveals the ongoing
conflicts and issues that China encountered with the US and its surrounding states when it
emerged as a powerful regional hegemon. I have reviewed particular journals of international
security and East Asian regional politics with a specific focus on China.
Moreover, the second component of this research focuses on China's politics and
history through a second-level of analysis, complemented by the theoretical lens above. This
part is grounded in document analysis of both primary sources, including the CCP's policy
statements since the 1980s, the CCP top leaders' public speeches since the 2000s, and Chinese
authoritative newspaper accounts in Chinese and English, and secondary sources, including the
latest issues of current journals on international relations. Consequentially, by looking into the
Chinese political and historical background and contemporary China's responses to ecopolitical
opportunities and challenges, especially the global pandemic in 2020, I was able to thoroughly
study the implications of China's emergence and the possibility of the peaceful rise of China in
the global environment.

III. A Review of the Theoretical Literature on China’s Rise
To questions of international politics, there are two primary disputed and distinct
theoretical approaches, neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Scholars writing from these
approaches have to interpret the relationship between the US and China and the emergence of
China in international politics (See Figure 1 Literature Map). Both neo-realist and neo-liberal
scholars agree that China has already risen quite a bit inevitably since the beginning of the 21st
8

century due to increasing hard-power as well as soft-power strengths. Nevertheless, the
essential questions left for them are how far China will rise and what the impacts will be on the
rest of the world. They disagree on the essential path of this rise—conflictual or peaceful.

Figure 1: Literature Map of China's Rise (Created by Sheldon Xie)
One of the leading examples of a neo-realist approach comes from John Mearsheimer
(2014), an influential political scientist who argues for an interstate relations framework based
on offensive political realism, the cornerstones for the balance of power. According to
Mearsheimer, great powers as strategic actors prioritize their survival in a world "where there
is no agency to protect them from each other" (Mearsheimer 2014, 21). Based on the ultimate
goal of surviving in international politics, the great powers will maximize their security by
seeking regional hegemony, concentrating on enlarging their military capabilities to pursue a
more certain circumstance for their sovereignty and autonomy (Mearsheimer 2014; 2018). For
Mearsheimer, power, defined as resources, is the currency of international politics, and in turn,
is based on an accumulation of wealth and military might.
9

In contrast, neo-liberals argue that neo-realists often oversimplify the dynamics of
power and interstate interaction. Instead, neo-liberals turn the focus to soft power, whose
essential sources rest on cultures, political values, and foreign policies (Nye 2004; 2011).
Specifically, Joseph Nye, a leading neo-liberal political scientist, highlights the efficacy of softpower behaviors for great power states, such as agenda-setting, attraction (including cultural,
economic, and political), and persuasion, in seeking a liberal hegemony to spread their
influence in the global politics (Nye 2004; 2011). Through these soft-power strategies rather
than military ones, the states are more likely to develop themselves and emerge as international
players by peacefully pursuing a liberal hegemony.
Even though Nye (2011) perfects his arguments and advocates that great powers ought
to exert "smart power," a synthesis of traditional hard power, including military and economic
resources, and soft power, including institutions, culture, ideas, the perception of legitimacy,
and values, when they strive for a liberal hegemony (Nye 2011, 207-208). In contrast,
Mearsheimer (2018) refutes the methodology of seeking liberal hegemony in his latest work,
The Great Delusion. According to his critique, it is problematic to promote liberal hegemony
through these soft-power behaviors because it often involves military or political interference
with other countries, undermining the notion of sovereignty and autonomy in international
relations (Mearsheimer 2018). As Mearsheimer points out, the presence of a liberal powerful
state prone to intervening in other countries with the threat of the use of force "increases the
amount of conflicts" and "creates greater instability" (Mearsheimer 2018, 152, 162). Therefore,
although there has been a heated dispute between two distinct perspectives, they provide two
fundamental theoretical frameworks about what dynamics of power the states emphasize in the
path of rising in global politics.
How Does China Rise Under a Conflictual Context with the US?
With comprehensive scholarly works addressing the substantial doctrines of neo10

realism and neo-liberalism, many scholars from political science and diplomacy have
developed thorough analyses of China's rise under the conflictual context with the United States,
especially since the 2000s with the adoption of two theoretical routes—peaceful or violent.
Therefore, scholars explore the implications for neo-realist and neo-liberal theories in a specific
case study of the country, rising China, and examine how they predict the interstate relations
between the status-quo and rising power will trend over the coming decades.
It is striking that neo-realists hold a pessimistic perspective of the current and
forthcoming trends in the US and China relations, mainly as China is a challenging rising power
(Mearsheimer 2014). They argue that China's rise is unlikely to be tranquil, and the rivalries
between the US and China will be more competitive in the longer term since the US as a status
quo power will thwart China's rise, even though hot wars are more likely to occur (Allison
2017; Hajrullahu 2015; Mearsheimer 2014). Mearsheimer (2014) explores this interstate
relation with an emphasis on current military and economic dilemmas that the US and China
have encountered in their realpolitik, such as the dispute in the South China Sea, while Allison
(2017) utilizes comparable case analysis of Athens vs. Sparta and Britain vs. Germany to
investigate the recent US-China relations via the historical analytical angle of Thucydides's
Trap. Thucydides's Trap refers to "the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a
rising power threatens to displace a ruling power" (Allison 2017, xvi.). Allison, a complex
scholar, shares neo-realists' concerns about the competition between the US and China in a
power transition. In his description, the US is the ruling power that fears being replaced by the
rising power, China. Therefore, demonstrating an application of neo-realism in US-China
relations, these neo-realist works maintain that the conflicts and competitions in security and
economy between these two big powers will continue to be more intense and severe because
the US will definitely use a variety of measures to constrain China which may eventually
pursue regional hegemony in Asian-Pacific region (Allison 2017; Hajrullahu 2015;
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Mearsheimer 2014).
However, the neo-liberal approach to this issue offers a different picture. Dr. Henry
Kissinger, a well-known traditional realist who draws on some elements of neorealism as well
as some elements of neo-liberalism, goes along with the significance of soft power that Nye
(2004) asserts, and argues that the crucial competition between the United States and China is
more likely to be economic and social than military (Kissinger 2011; Nye 2004). By briefly
looking through Chinese historical civilization and applying his interactions with top leaders
of China throughout the US and China's diplomatic history in his work, On China, Kissinger
asserts that the US-China relationship is "less partnership than 'co-evolution' " (Kissinger 2011,
526). What Kissinger suggests is that both countries' relations will move forwards to a
relatively peaceful trend—they both strive for their domestic imperatives, such as on domestic
economic prosperity, cooperate with each other where possible, such as economic or climate
issues, and adjust their bilateral relationship to minimize conflicts (Kissinger 2011).
Moreover, recent scholarly works since the 2010s have realized the advantages and
potentials of China's use of soft power for its peaceful rise. To be specific, with a tremendous
economic achievement from the 1980s, China has engaged economically with other countries
and the US in terms of trade, investment, and finance, which is in accordance with liberal
economic interdependence theory (Buzan and Cox 2013; Li and Worm 2010; Shirk 2013). By
putting its economic development as the top priority, China has formulated more intertwined
economic relationships with other countries, especially the neighboring states, and leveraged
influence by using its unique resources and policies as economic temptation, which is most
likely to alleviate possible interstate conflicts (Buzan and Cox 2013; Li and Worm 2010; Shirk
2013). Therefore, China's economic relationships are instrumental in seeing China's soft power
strengths, particularly in economic attractions, but these scholars' works focus on interstate
diplomacy while avoiding the exploration of China's regime and governance to examine its
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soft-power dynamics to support China itself to rise in international politics.
China and the CCP: The Domestic Potential and Dynamics of China's Rise
China and its governing party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), play a crucial role
in generating the stimuli for its emergence in global politics. In other words, we cannot interpret
and predict the path of rising China as well as its diplomatic interaction with other states in the
international platform without digging into the literature on the inner workings and dynamics
of China's governmental system.
In the publications addressing the issue of China's regime and governance, although the
CCP has been in a protracted state of "atrophy," it has undertaken a number of adaptive
measures aimed at reinventing itself from the role of the revolutionary party to the ruling party
as well as strengthening its rule and legitimacy as a highly centralized authority (McGregor
2010; Shambaugh 2008, 3-5). Moreover, writing in 2019, Zhang and Ginsburg (2019) argue
that China has an inclination towards "law and order" and pro-legality throughout Chinese
sociopolitical culture because of unprecedentedly broad anti-corruption campaigns and
dramatic judicial and constitutional developments under Xi Jinping's rule (323). By embracing
law and order, China strengthens its governing capability by supporting the role of the
legislature and makes both domestic and diplomatic circumstances ordered and compelling for
cooperation over antagonization with other states.
While there has been a comprehensive and robust treatment of China as a rising power
by both neo-realist and neo-liberal scholars, this scholarship has failed to incorporate insights
from the second level of analysis. In an attempt to fill this gap, what follows is a discussion
that incorporates both the insights of third-level analysis with second-level analysis of Chinese
statecraft and its political system.
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IV. A Neo-Realist Approach to the Rise of China: NOT PEACEFUL
First and foremost, at present, China an advantage over other countries in the region in
terms of military capability, resources, and technology not only as an Asian-Pacific regional
power but a new global power from a neo-realist perspective. More importantly, as a rising
global power, China faces the biggest challenge on its path of emergence as another superpower
from the great incumbent power, the US, which is afraid of being replaced itself by China.
Similarly, the neighboring countries of China in the Asia-Pacific region have fallen into a
security dilemma due to the fear of a potential regional hegemon. Under the tension among
China, the US, and China's neighbor states, China's emergence is expected to be more
conflictual rather than peaceful because they risk threats of forces from either China or the US.
Therefore, the following neo-realist demonstration of China's conflictual rise is centered on
security competitions and China's strategic rationality replying to the US's policies of
containment.
Survival and Security Competition
To begin with, to sustain its self-development and rise in the international system, China
as an emerging global superpower must prioritize its survival and make sure it is secure in the
global environment. Neo-realists have the commonsense that international states must take
priority in their status of security to survive. As their ultimate and significant goal, the survival
of states refers to "maintaining a state's territorial integrity" and "preserving the autonomy of a
state's policymaking process" (Mearsheimer 2014, 364). The driving force of survival
determines states' logic of behaviors and, in turn, strengthens their relative power by developing
military capabilities. In order to pursue a more certain circumstance for their sovereignty and
autonomy, according to Mearsheimer, an offensive neo-realist, the standard and effective way
is to maximize their shares of power and establish hegemony in their region of the world by
14

enlarging their military capabilities and resources. The United States is an excellent example
of a state that adopts this effective realist way to set up its regional hegemon in the "Western
Hemisphere" (Mearsheimer 2014, 362). Therefore, in addition to the rationality of state actors,
as "strategic calculators," the US or China will excel at behaving through prudent strategies to
ensure and maximize their chances of survival in the stage of international politics (Hajrullahu
2015, 268).
The security dilemmas between China and its neighbors are haunting China's path of
rising to global power. There is no denying that China is not engaged in a severe border dispute
with any of its neighbors, and it does not have hot wars with them so far. However, China still
has competitive sovereignty issues, such as the dispute regarding the South China Sea and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Because of historical controversial territorial
entitlement and insecurity towards China's status as a regional hegemon, China and its
neighbors, including the Philippines, Japan, and India, disagree significantly over who controls
that large body of water or islands in the South and East China Sea (Shirk 2013, 2). Responding
to China's increasing military power in the South China Sea and even in the Asian-Pacific
region, India, Japan, Australia, and the United States rejoined the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (QSD) in 2017 in order to hedge the Chinese predominance over the Asian-Pacific
region and to revive regional security. However, this conflictual tension about these
sovereignty conflicts between China and its neighbors reveals that the US and the countries
surrounding China feel insecure and even threatened by China's potential influence and
dominance over the Asian-Pacific area as a rising regional hegemon.
Moreover, the emergence of a new power in world politics, especially one which breaks
the original global balance of power, might intensify and accelerate the security competitions
between the superpower state and the rising power state, and even between the rising power
state and its neighboring states. Precisely, the increasing conflict between the incumbents and
15

challengers caused by their security and survival concerns is inevitable when they "meet at the
top of the great power hierarchy" (Buzan and Cox 2013, 110). Currently, China plays the role
of challenger, closing the power gap with the US through economic growth and the expansion
of military forces to make its security situation unlikely to be at risk, while the great incumbent
power, the US, might not endure the emergence of a rising peer competitor. Indeed, the more
powerful a state is comparable to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be in danger.
Under this security dilemma, rising China will inescapably be checked and contained by the
US, which intends to maintain its superior position in the global balance of power, which may
exacerbate the conflictual tension among these great, powerful states and may even result in
regional preemptive wars to promote its rise on the international stage in terms of its military
strength.
With US's Containment and Strategic Economic Interests—Is a Warlike Rise
Possible?
With America's containment of China and China's reactions to these containments,
China's relations with the US can be described as a "cold peace"—with a large number of
threats and frictions in economic, political, and military domains (Buzan and Cox 2013, 114).
To be specific, as an essentially defensive strategy, containment strategies such as slackening
Chinese economic growth and fomenting political troubles for China are often adopted by the
US to check China and prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. For example, since 2018,
the Trump administration has imposed tariffs on $34 billion worth of Chinese products and
further restricted Huawei, the Chinese telecom company that relies on American components
suppliers through economic sanctions (Swanson and Kang 2020). In addition to threatening a
ban on WeChat and Tik-Tok transactions, the prevalent social media owned by Chinese
companies, the US has revoked the visas and constrained entry for more than 1,000 students
and researchers who were said to have connections with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
16

and People's Liberal Army (PLA) in the middle of 2020 (Davidson 2020; Paul 2020). In
contrast, in keeping with the principles of offensive realism, China has employed assertive
actions in the South and East Sea with the PLA Navy to impede US military interference in
disputes over Chinese maritime boundaries, thus pushing the US power out of the Asian-Pacific
region (Mearsheimer 2014, 371; Shirk 2013, 3). Therefore, these numerous heated issues not
only make social media an element of a trade war between the US and China but also amplify
the severity of the US-China battle in economic, political, and military spectrums.
What is more, as a prevailing hegemon in Asia, emerging China seems to exceed the
scope of cold peace and tends to warlike rise, especially among its neighboring countries. In
other words, China is always likely to launch a small-scale hot war or attack other countries as
threats to achieve regional hegemony by following realist logic. According to neo-realism,
rationality is the major cornerstone of the great powers' actions. For China, specifically,
economic interests are the strategic reason to initiate a war because economic power is
fundamental and able to stimulate China's economic prosperity. Even though China has
engaged with its neighbors through investments and trades, it is still possible that a more
assertive China will utilize military forces or even start a small-scale war to gain control over
the South China Sea (Mearsheimer 2014, 409). The realist logic behind these decisions is
simple—low costs and high profits. With mature navy bases and warships in the Leizhou
Peninsula and Hainan Island, China is capable of pre-empting the full domination of the South
China Sea promptly if a small-scale war with others occurs with few investments. By fighting
small regional wars with economically lower costs, China can fully exploit the seabed and fuel
under the South China Sea, which means a substantial economic benefit for China. Thus, from
a neo-realist perspective, China's rise will not be peaceful and may likely turn to the path of
warlike rise among its neighboring countries due to China's strategic rationality.
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V. China's Soft-Power Mechanism
It is interesting to see that, from a neo-realist perspective, China would fall into a severe
security dilemma with other great powers and neighboring states due to its incremental
influence in the Asian-Pacific area, which makes the relationship between China and other
counties tense and conflictual. However, if we explore Chinese beliefs and theories about the
utilization of soft power, China may have the ability to get out of the security dilemma that has
trapped so many other great powers, which tackles neo-realist concerns. Therefore, in this
chapter, I will examine China's soft-power mechanism grounded in the Confucian idea of
"harmony" throughout the CCP's governance and state-run media system (See Figure 2: China's
Soft Power Mechanism).

Figure 2: China's Soft Power Mechanism (Created by Sheldon Xie)
Socioeconomic Harmony: Xiaokang and Datong Society
First, the idea of harmony (hexie 和 谐 ), derived from traditional Confucianism, is
currently the critical concept for the CCP governance in domestic and foreign affairs. This term,
first used by the Hu Jintao (former President of the People's Republic of China, hereafter PRC)
and Wen Jiabao (former Prime Minister of the PRC) administration, aims to formulate a
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harmonious society domestically and contribute to building a harmonious world globally. To
be specific, the CCP's domestic agenda of harmony rests on the continuous economic
development and the preservation of social harmony "within a vast population experiencing
both unprecedented prosperity and unaccustomed levels of inequality"; and its foreign agenda
centered on "avoiding dramatic moves," which means that China would avert any unnecessary
military conflicts with its neighbors and any country in the world (Kissinger 2011, 490). These
agendas play a more visible international leadership role and create a peaceful global
environment for every country. Notably, the CCP's leadership since the 2000s has turned to
traditional Chinese wisdom, especially Confucian classics, to counter domestic and
international challenges in the twenty-first century.
The revival of Confucian connotations in the CCP's governance suggests that the idea
of harmony has been an important source of Chinese soft power via a continuity between
ancient Chinese traditions and China's self-development in the modern era. The Confucian term,
xiaokang ( 小 康 ), frequently occurs in recent official Chinese governmental statements to
describe the CCP's socioeconomic plans and pursues in the following years under the
framework of harmony since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013. Xiaokang, often translated as
"moderately prosperous" or "moderately well-off" based on Confucian moral philosophy,
refers to describe a society where "people work for their own benefit and for their families"
and they "strive to accumulate wealth and property" (The Economist 2007; Wang and Qian
2020). In one of the thematic speeches in the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 2017, Xi
repeatedly emphasized the essentiality of the establishment of a comprehensive "xiaokang
society" (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) in the journey of achieving a socialist modern country
(Xinhua 2017). According to Confucian texts, xiaokang society is understood by a middleground prosperity "in which all are adequately provided for" but still with realistic moral issues,
such as inequality, selfishness, and a lack of public spirit (Smith 2019, 66). In this way, with
19

the traditional cultural significance stemming from Confucianism, the model of xiaokang
provides a unique societal framework for current China itself to implement its political
planning regarding development.
Remarkably, the governing idea of harmony has been evolved to adjust to the CCP's
rhetoric and the contemporary context of China, in contrast to its original meanings in
Confucian texts. To be specific, the policy adoption of xiaokang by the CCP has created new
implications and meanings to match the party-state legitimacy and the Chinese government's
agendas. The current Chinese leadership has employed both qualitative and quantitative
measures to evaluate the xiaokang society and implement relative ecopolitical goals since the
Reform and Open Up (gaige kaifang 改革开放) policy has been put forwards in the past 40
years. According to Deng Xiaoping, the second core CCP leader, xiaokang is identified as a
socioeconomic prosperity status or short-term goal throughout China's own development path
of pursuing "Four Modernizations" (sige xiandaihua 四个现代化) in the fields of agriculture,
industry, defense, and science and technology (Smith 2019, 66; Wang and Qian 2020). During
the early 1980s, Deng explained xiaokang through a more quantitative perspective—he
asserted that xiaokang means that China's GDP per capita would reach $800 by the end of the
20th century, while this goal was achieved at the end of 1997, two years ahead of Deng's
stipulated timeline (Wang and Qian 2020; WorldBank, China GDP per capita current US
Dollars). Nevertheless, during Xi's era, the idea of comprehensive xiaokang highlighted by Xi
is focusing more on precise poverty alleviation in rural areas and the guarantee of a higher
quality of people's lives rather than abstract and statistical data such as the GDP (Xinhua 2017).
Therefore, the xiaokang policy embedded in the Confucian idea of harmony has become an
essential part of the CCP's mission to navigate China's path of development and modernism,
particularly in terms of economic and societal aspects.
Likewise, the term datong (大同), also stemming from the Confucian idea of harmony
20

and addressed by current Chinese leaders, has an inspiring and modern significance in both
China's domestic affairs and diplomacy in a contemporary global context. The concept of
datong first appeared in the Book of Rites (Liji 礼记), one of the prevailing Confucian classics
compiled in the Han Dynasty (202 BCE – 220 CE), and it was used to portray a kind of utopia
in the ancient world (Smith 2019, 63-64). In the opening section on datong in the Book of Rites,
the significance of this concept is illustrated as follows: "When the Great Way was pursued, a
public and common spirit ruled all under the sky (dadao zhi xing ye, tianxia weigong 大道之
行也，天下为公)." The central theme and purpose of datong in traditional Confucianism was
building an egalitarian society with all common good for all people and an ideal world "with
no borders, no crime, no waste, no need to adhere to the classical relationships, and no
unnecessary suffering" (Smith 2019, 64). For this reason, the utopian world of datong provides
a plausible blueprint for attaining China's socialist modernism on the basis of the traditional
Confucian idea of harmony.
Additionally, the Confucian term datong has gained new importance in the 21st century
context during its implication in China's diplomacy. Precisely, the CCP elites lean to associate
datong more closely to China's expectation of building a peaceful globe with other sovereign
states. The thought of ren (仁), as a foundational theme often interpreted as benevolence and
love in traditional Confucianism, has been accentuated by the CCP in its reconceptualization
of datong world—the grand union of universal brotherhood—in the contemporary context. As
Dai Bingguo, the former director of the CCP's Central Foreign Affairs Office, mentioned in his
speech in the symposium concerning peaceful Chinese development, he underlined that this
harmonious thought has "infiltrated the spiritual world of generations of Chinese people" and
evolved into vital philosophical values for Chinese people to deal with relations among
countries or nations (Dai 2011). Besides, Xi repeatedly advocated for all global countries to
work together to build "a community with a shared future for mankind" (Renlei mingyun
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gongtongti 人类命运共同体) and let all people live in a permanently peaceful, universally
secure, commonly prosperous, continuously inclusive, and sustainably eco-friendly
circumstance (Xi 2017; Xi 2021). Therein, the blueprint of the datong world as a ubiquitous
but distinct Party rhetoric grounded in traditional Confucian harmonious culture plays a
guiding role for China in dealing with foreign relations via the utilization of placid soft-power
strategies rather than radical ones with forces throughout China's path of development.
China's Media System
The Chinese public media system is often overlooked by Western scholars due to its
strong political propaganda dissemination, but this media system retains its effective control in
the internal and external flow of information via regulated surveillance and promotes Chinese
culture abroad, which is regarded as another critical tool in China's soft power mechanism.
First, China has a systematic propaganda apparatus from national-level to municipallevel with authoritative and regulatory surveillance. The CCP Propaganda Department
(Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuan bu 中共中央宣传部, hereafter CCPPD), as Shambaugh
described, is a "real nerve center" of the entire Chinese media system (Shambaugh 2007, 33).
The CCPPD is operated directly under the CCP Central Committee, and most of important
CCP leaders in the Politburo have served as the head director of the CCPPD, which indicates
that the CCPPD plays a principal role of a comprehensive functional department for the Party
ideology (Shambaugh 2007, 34-35). In addition, the CCPPD has the supreme authority over
the institutions or agencies which cover a series of culture and entertainment fields, including
film, television, broadcasts, and both national and municipal press or academic publications
(Shambaugh 2007, 37-38). Take the Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua she 新华社) as an example.
The Xinhua News Agency, one of China's official state news services, functions as a large,
sprawling information organization to "report news and to disseminate Party and state
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propaganda" throughout the country and over the world (Shambaugh 2007, 44). The news
reports, particularly those released by Xinhua's international section, would be overseen by the
cadres from the CCPPD to make sure these reports follow the CCPPD directives or news
guidance, such as the specific usage or avoidance of certain topics or terminology (Shambaugh
2007, 44). Therefore, the Chinese state government was deeply and efficiently involved in the
media publication through regulations and supervision to direct what contemporary image of
China which the Chinese leadership would love to convey both to its domestic audience and to
the rest of the world.
More importantly, with regulatory surveillance, the CCP separates the external
propaganda (duiwai xuanchuan 对 外 宣 传 ) from the whole bureaucratic system of media
advocation and considers it as a principal tool for the CCP's leadership and foreign affairs,
which contributes to delivering China's positive image and promoting Chinese culture abroad.
Precisely, the CCP established the External Propaganda Leading Group (Duiwai Xuanchuan
Lingdao Xiaozu 对外宣传领导小组) and the Foreign Affairs Leading Group (Waishi Lingdao
Xiaozu 外 事 领 导 小 组 ) to oversee this independent propaganda apparatus under the joint
sponsorship of the CCP Central Committee and State Council (Shambaugh 2007, 47). These
Leading Groups under the CCP's supervision are responsible for orientating towards several
crucial missions regarding external propaganda, including telling China's story to the world,
promulgating Chinese government policies, particularly China's foreign policy, spreading
Chinese culture abroad through different cultural or exchange projects, and countering hostile
foreign propaganda (Shambaugh 2007, 48-49). There are a variety of media organizations
involving these external propaganda missions, such as People's Daily foreign edition, China
Daily, international-based channel—China Global Television Network (CGTV) under China
Central Television (CCTV), and Voice of China. Therein, China has integral broadcasters and
clear missions to actively engage in publicizing Chinese perspectives and culture to the rest of
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the world.
More significantly, the biggest advantage of China's media mechanism is from the
richness as well as the uniqueness of Chinese culture, which has extensive impacts throughout
the whole societal structure on the basis of Daoist philosophy. On the one hand, China has its
distinct and continuous long history of more than approximately 5,000 years; on the other hand,
Chinese culture and civilization is a diverse combination of "social relationships, customs,
values, norms, and institutions that constitute and inform society" (Luo 2015, 61). For this
reason, the long history and splendid civilization of China provide an "intangible foundation"
and influential cultural force to bolster China's media mechanism both internally and externally
(Luo 2015, 61). Additionally, to better understand the scope of the social structure that Chinese
culture would impact, it is necessary to highlight a systematic traditional Chinese social system
as depicted in the writings of Laozi, a famous Daoist philosopher during the 6th century BC. In
his work Tao Te Ching (Dao De Jing 道德经), there is a quote discussing the frame and features
of the Chinese social system:
Therefore, applying that to oneself, one comes to know oneself (故以身观身);
Applying that to itself, a family comes to know itself (以家观家);
Applying that to itself, a village comes to know itself (以乡观乡);
Applying that to itself, a nation comes to know itself (以邦观邦);
Applying that to itself, the world comes to know itself (以天下观天下).
How do I get to know what the world is like (吾何以知天下然哉)?
By such application (以此).
(Yuan 2010, 115-116)
In this quote, Laozi categorized the traditional Chinese social system by five levels—
the individual level (shen 身), the family level (jia 家), the community level (xiang 乡), the
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national level (guo 国), and the world level (tian xia 天下) as seen through the lens of Daoist
philosophy (Luo 2015, 63; Yuan 2010). This social system is distributed and interconnected
among adjacent layers, such as the levels between the individual and family. When applying
this Daoist framework to contemporary China's media mechanism, Luo points out that Chinese
culture and civilization as a critical cultural force have a comprehensive influence throughout
this social system (Luo 2015, 64-65). The reason for its thorough impact is that these values,
customs, cultural habits, or social norms nourished by Chinese civilization over time have been
rooted in the Chinese people's way of thinking, as well as their cultural identities, which
cultivates a collective empathy and symphonious resonance from individuals to the national or
even the global level. A good example to reveal this thorough the impact of Chinese civilization
is a cultural product, the Spring Festival Gala, made by China's mainstream media broadcaster,
CCTV (Luo 2015, 65-66). The Spring Festival Gala, held on every Lunar New Year Eve
evening, is a vast live cultural performance in celebration of the national holiday, Lunar New
Year (or Spring Festival), for all Chinese people as well as the Asian community more broadly.
The Lunar New Year not only represents the reunion of family and community but also an
emblematic Chinese cultural festival celebrated by other Asian communities abroad and
international audiences via watching the Spring Festival Gala. Therefore, China's media
mechanism can leverage its comprehensive sociocultural effect throughout the whole social
system from the individual level to the world level through the uniqueness and richness of
Chinese culture as displayed in this media event.

VI. A Neo-Liberal Approach: Peaceful Rise through Soft-Power Strategies
Compared with a neo-realist illustration that China's rise is unlikely to be peaceful, the
neo-liberal approach draws a dissimilar conclusion as it depicts the peaceful rise of China
through the lens of soft power. According to Joseph Nye, a fundamental neo-liberal political
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scientist, the key sources of soft power rely on cultural ideals as well as political and foreign
policies (Nye 2004, 11). Therefore, closely following what Nye has maintained, the neo-liberal
demonstration below tackles the question of what explains China's rapid rise under a likely
peaceful path by emphasizing cultural discourses, particularly the mega-events held by China,
and economic interdependence theory applied in China's economic development as well as
temptation towards other countries based on China's media framework and the idea of harmony
illustrated above.
Cultural Attraction: A Harmonious Figure to the World
Since the 2000s, China has made efforts to deliver a harmonious image to the world
through the exercise of soft power, especially transmitting China's diplomatic values rooted in
Confucianism, hosting mega events, and making a difference culturally via Chinese media and
big technology. Even though China's cultural soft-power strategies would have a weak impact
on altering perceptions of China as an authoritarian state among most democratic countries in
the Western Hemisphere, this practice of China's cultural soft power indeed showcases a
friendly and positive figure to the world, which makes the path of China's rise less inevitably
prone to interstate conflicts and regional wars (Manzenreiter 2010).
First, the concept of harmony, deeply rooted in Confucianism, is the central theme of
China exercising soft power strategies in international relations. The discourse of harmony in
soft power aim at conveying China's overall benignity, humility, and benevolence to attract
both domestic audience and international audience from all over the world. President Xi
Jinping, the Secretary of the CCP, emphasized that the value of harmony is "a fine tradition
and lofty virtue of Chinese nation," and it should permeate Chinese society and contemporary
culture (Xi 2014; Hagstrom and Nordin 2020). Particularly, in foreign affairs, Xi has inherited
and continued the major themes of "harmonious society" (hexie shehui 和 谐 社 会 ) and
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"harmonious world" (hexie shijie 和 谐 世 界 ) from his predecessor, President Hu Jintao, in
order to "increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate
China's message to the world" (Hu 2005; Xihua 2014). Its diplomatic application is that China
will pursue peaceful coexistence with other states even whose regime types are different from
China's and spread Chinese cultural attraction smoothly by seeking common ground and
putting aside disputes as well as differences. Hence, the cultural-based principle of harmony
directs Chinese leaders to formulate peaceful and smooth interactions with neighboring and
western countries on China's path to rise within the international system.
The Mega events, such as the Olympics in 2008 hosted by the Chinese Olympic
Committee (Zhongguo aoweihui 中国奥委会), play an instrumental role in communicating the
Chinese value of harmony to showcase a carefully constructed image of China to the world.
As an official affiliate governmental agency administered by General Administration of Sport
of China (Zhongguo guojia tiyu zongju 中国国家体育总局), the Chinese Olympic Committee
was responsible for the organization and operation of the whole 2008 Olympic Games. Notably,
for the opening and closing ceremonies, this committee chose Zhang Yimou as the director
because he professionally integrated the transmission of Chinese culture and embraced
international culture for a broader audience (Chen et al. 2012). For the Chinese government,
the 2008 Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony was a brilliant chance to display rapid
socioeconomic development, gain respect and favor internationally, and develop "favorable
media coverage worldwide" (Chen et al. 2012, 188). Not only did it present the new
technologies, innovations, and advanced media techniques to the rest of the world, but as a
national and cultural victory, it strongly responded to the Chinese "century of national
humiliation" from the mid-19th century with unprecedented historical significance (Chen et al.
2012, 195; Zhang 2012, 147-148). This splendid state-run media discourse improved China's
capability of organizing and managing the complicated global sports event and built China's
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national cultural identity in the world. Hence, by launching this massive mega event, China
would implement its own soft-power agenda to its friends alongside its peaceful development
into the top tier of global superpowers, which indicates that "China's advancement can bring
others along and unify people of different ethnicity on a global scale" with the key themes of
harmony and peace in both cultural and diplomatic fields (Chen et al. 2012, 191; Zhang 2012,
149).
However, the exercise of Chinese soft power brought a multitude of critiques
concerning its effectiveness and consequences. The harmony discourse in either diplomacy or
mega events such as the Olympics is regarded as a Chinese exercise of "sharp soft power,"
which would be eventually "enmeshed in legitimizing and enabling the use of physical force"
(Hagstorm and Nordin 2020, 520-521). This suggests a potentially dangerous likelihood that
China's exercise of soft power might be transformed into a coercive exercise of hard power,
which increases the uncertainty and instability of the global political atmosphere. Besides,
these harmonious discourses are not necessarily unattractive to democratic countries that
emphasize human rights, liberalism, and democracy, making it difficult to alter their
recognitions and perceptions of China as an authoritarian state (Hagstorm and Nordin 2020;
Manzenreiter 2010). Although it is hard for China to change its perceptions among the
Western-dominated media world via these cultural discourses, China has delivered a
harmonious and significant impression as a reliable and indispensable member of the
international community, which leads China's rise in a less antagonistic and conflictual way
via the exercise of cultural soft power.
Economic Interdependence and Economic Temptation
The profound logic behind China's rapid development in the past decades is following
the theory of economic interdependence. This theory emphasizes the inextricable economic
bonds to other potential rival states and economic prosperity as states' main goals rather than a
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struggle with wars. In other words, economic interdependence motivates states to "pursue
cooperation and avoid conflicts, particularly with trading partners," promotes a more robust
economic integration, generates more incredible benefits in the sphere of security and economy
(Hajrullahu 2015, 272; Shirk 2013, 4). From the later 1970s onward, China has been a great
exemplar state of adopting the framework of economic interdependence theory.
Firstly, it is evident that China has achieved impressive and successful progress in
constructing a robust economy, which provides a vital source of soft power for China in the
economic and political domain. Notably, as the largest developing country in the world, China
has made a hugely impressive success in boosting GDP since 1978 and getting rid of poverty
with a 0.5 poverty rate in 2016, whereas many other developing countries in Asia, such as
Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia, are still "struggling with figure out the right approach to
development" (Li and Worm 2011, 80; WorldBank, China Poverty Headcount Ratio). China's
GDP in 2019 (11.5 trillion dollars) is nearly 39.2 times larger than its GDP in 1978 (293.6
billion dollars) (WorldBank, China GDP constant 2010 US Dollars). By shifting to the policy
of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, China abandoned the format of total state control
over the economy and opened important space for the market to operate within governmental
regulation. With a regulated market, China started engaging not only its neighboring states but
other states in the Western world at a rapid pace, as well as entering and becoming involved in
the global system of trade, business, education, and foreign investments. This opening was
possible because of changes in China’s domestic system in that some interaction with free
markets was to be accepted. As Buzan and Cox mentioned, China's peaceful rise began in 1978
when the reform and open policy was implemented, and China started to embrace the world
(Buzan and Cox 2013, 111). For this reason, China put its economic development and
prosperity as a priority over the following decades, thus trying its best to ensure stability, peace,
and sustainability among its regional and global partners.
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Secondly, under the framework of economic interdependence, China has the intention
to pursue economic stability and common security through inter-state cooperation and
globalization. According to Chinese governmental public statements, China proclaims "peace
and development" as its two essential norms of diplomacy and interaction with the
contemporary world as well, and commits to follow the principles of "peaceful coexistence"
and "no-interference of other nation's domestic affairs" (Li and Worm 2011, 78). Learning from
Chinese traditions and lessons from the humiliating history in the past century, President Xi's
leadership would lead a rising China to commit to following "a harmonious and peaceful
development path (Heping fazhan daolu 和平发展道路)," according to Xi's public speech (Xi
2015). This assertion of the Chinese leader, corresponding to Confucian pacifism advocated by
China with its deep-rooted Confucian culture, indeed gives a friendly and benevolent
impression to the neighboring states that their relations with China will be mutually respectful.
In addition, China had already accessed the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which
reveals that China strived for embracing economic integration and world peace among
countries in the Asian-Pacific region as well as throughout the globalized world, and obtaining
its economic interests for China's economic growth in the long term (Shirk 2013, 4).
More recently, China has a relatively steady trend towards relations with its neighbors,
especially in Southeast Asia, through multilateral economic cooperation. In mid-November
2020, China, many states in Southeast Asia from Vietnam to Myanmar, and other powerful
states in the Pacific area like Japan and New Zealand officially signed the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), one of the world's most extensive regional free
trade agreements that carries a considerable influence on more than 2.2 billion people among
the Asian-Pacific area (Bradsher and Swanson 2020). Initiated by China's Ministry of
Commerce and other Southeast countries' economic ministries, the RECP attempts to create a
unified and dynamic free market with reduced and even zero tariffs among membership
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countries (Bradsher and Swanson 2020). Here, China has made a promotive contribution to
forging much closer economic ties with its neighboring states to push back on the Trump
administration's tariffs containment on Chinese products and to facilitate world free trade
through multilateral cooperation and globalization in international society.
Moreover, China would love to adopt the norm of "Make Money, Not War" by creating
economic temptations through foreign direct investments among its neighbors (Li and Worm
2010, 86; Mearsheimer 2014, 407). This norm indicates that China is focusing on delivering
impressive economic consequences and producing great wealth together to enhance shared
prosperity by promoting Chinese business and investment opportunities overseas. To be
specific, China's government committed to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Program,
utilizing infrastructure and funding as a soft-power strategic attraction to recreate land and
maritime trading routes in Eurasia and Africa (Crabtree 2019, 69). By doing so, not only does
China showcase its intention of cooperation and alliance with other states rather than
confrontation, but also it reveals China's more vital potential capability to mitigate unnecessary
military confrontations through its prosperous economic performance and soft-power
attractiveness.

VII. Crisis Management: Handling the Global Pandemic in 2020
In 2020, people around the world were shocked by the unprecedented global pandemic
which struck most of the states internationally, no matter whether they were a great power or
not, challenging governance, crisis management, resistance to the economic crisis, and other
domains in the soft power of states. Under the challenging COVID-19 pandemic, China shows
more mature crisis management, robust resistance to the economic crisis caused by the global
pandemic domestically, and cooperative diplomatic strategies in dealing with this worldwide
public health crisis. This efficient performance in the fight with COVID-19 indicates that China
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is collecting its soft-power strengths and advantages and cooperating with the rest of the world
humbly through diplomacy on its path to a peaceful rise in world politics (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Process of China Leveraging its soft-power influence during the COVID-19
Pandemic Challenge (Created by Sheldon Xie)
China's Domestic Governance in a Global Health Crisis
First, in fighting COVID-19, China has achieved more impressive progress and
outcomes than the US, its most significant rival state in international politics. According to
Joseph Nye, power is not only the capacity to do things but also to get the outcomes we want
in social situations, and soft power, described by Nye as "the second face of power," is more
associated with intangible assets like public policies or diplomacy (Nye 2004, 5). Take the
evident statistics of confirmed cases of COVID-19 as an example (See Table 1). Until the end
of November 2020, the sum of COVID-19 cases in China was 91,814, whereas the US's cases
have exceeded 11 million with a daily increase of 140,000 cases on average (ECDC, COVID19 Cases). These numbers are such a big surprise because, in terms of population, compared to
the US, which represents only 4.25% of the world population (330 million people), China is a
far more populous nation with 1.4 billion people (nearly 20% of the world's population in 2020)
(Worldometer, Population). More interestingly, in terms of democratic states, the US has gotten
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a much higher score from the Freedom House compared to China, currently 86 (United States)
over 10 (China) in the world so far, which assumes that the US has more competent capability
in democratic governance to handle the global public health crisis (Freedom House, Freedom
Score). Conversely, throughout the struggle with COVID-19 for nearly a year, the data tells us
a different story: currently, China has a more powerful competence to achieve the outcomes it
seeks, especially in fighting the global health crisis.
Table 1: COVID-19 Management Performance Comparison: China and the United States
China

United States

COVID-19 Confirmed Cases

91,814

13,383,321

Population

1,439,323,774

331,002,647

Cases/Population

0.006%

4.043%

Death Tolls

4,739

266,873

Death Rate (of Population)

0.00033%

0.08063%

(The statistics are updated as of the end of November 2020. Sources from "COVID-19
Situation Update Worldwide." European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control." 2020.
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases.)
However, many commentators will argue whether lack of freedom in China may have
helped it in the pandemic. This view is partially correct, but this progress is attributed to the
CCP's centralized domestic governance. Since President Hu's tenure, the CCP has launched a
series of systematic and comprehensive programs in order to "rebuild the party" and "improve
the party's ruling capacity" (Shambaugh 2008, 131). One of the special programs the CCP
undertook was the anti-corruption campaign throughout the party, which prevented this
"infectious cancer" from spreading to the whole bureaucracy and re-directed its domestic
governance to a more coherent and effective path (Shambaugh 2008, 132). More importantly,
the CCP also put forwards the mid-career training for the party cadres to be well-prepared for
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qualified public servants. Specifically, the party cadres would be required to participate in
either cadre management schools, affiliate governmental training programs, or municipal and
provincial public services organizations for a couple of months every five years to improve
their competence and skills (Shambaugh 2008, 143). For this reason, these systematic programs
of cadre training enhanced the officials' capability in dealing with governmental affairs,
implementing effective policies for their citizens, and managing crises at the municipal and
community level.
Impressively, these programs aimed at improving the party's ruling capacity paid off
when China was handling the pandemic. During the spring of 2020, when the coronavirus was
quickly diffused from Wuhan Province to the other provinces of China, there were no safe or
effective treatments or effective vaccines other than the proven nonpharmaceutical
interventions to conquer the pandemic—stifling the coronavirus through controlling the
sources of infection and blocking transmission (Uretsky 2020). The Chinese government
realized the importance of this proven method to intervene in the further spread of COVID-19
and accomplished a strict management process through early direction, isolation, medical
treatment, and tracing the close contacts of any infected individuals (AlTakarli 2020; Uretsky
2020). At the national level, the central authorities put forward public health strategies and
follow-up regulations for the confirmed cases, and assigned more than 1800 teams of
epidemiologists to "trace tens of thousands of people a day in Wuhan" (AlTakarli 2020, 46).
At the provincial or municipal level, thousands of temporary health and quarantine stations
were set up in a series of transportation areas, such as international airports, railway stations,
long-distance bus stations, or ferry terminals, for a community-wide infrared temperature
screening to detect the possible infected individuals (AlTakarli 2020, 46-47; Cyranoski 2020).
What is more, the Chinese government at this time also invested in high-tech contacttracing systems. A good example is the health code system which relied on a smartphone
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application. This health code app utilized three colors to categorize individuals into three
groups "based on their health status and travel history," which determined whether they were
prevented from traveling across provincial borders or needed to be quarantined (Altakarli 2020,
46). This health code system played an indispensable role in the governmental measures of reopening the cities and economy with a secure mechanism of restrictive contact-tracing and
effective detection of possible confirmed cases in mid-2020. There is no denying that the
drawbacks of the highly centralized bureaucracy still exist, such as lacking transparency and
delaying the announcement of the COVID-19 situation to the public at the beginning of the
Wuhan outbreak (Cyranoski 2020). However, these campaigns and investments in this
pandemic management have enhanced the CCP's reputation and rendered its governance more
cohesive as well as consistent with managing tremendous public health crises under the topdown administrative bureaucracy.
Compared to the US, which is a hotspot of the COVID-19 outbreak and has one of the
highest growth rates of COVID-19, China has brought the pandemic under control and has
fostered economic recovery by centralized domestic policies. Explicitly, it was effective for
the Chinese government to adopt a strict, nearly 11-week lengthy lockdown of major cities like
Wuhan at the beginning of the pandemic and mass testing among communities in response to
even the smallest outbreaks (Bradsher 2020). This provides an excellent example of Nye's
claim that soft power and hard power are closely interconnected, and the efficacious application
of soft power can have positive effects on a state's hard power. With its impressive and
efficacious handle on the coronavirus, China has recovered back up to the roughly 6% pace of
economic growth that was reported before the pandemic. Especially during the previous
"Golden Week" of the National Holiday in early October in China, the resurgence of domestic
consumption has been witnessed in this country as an increasing number of people went out to
eat, shopped, and even traveled (Bradsher 2020). Therefore, the coronavirus and economy are
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intertwined; so too must the crisis management under the COVID-19 outbreak and economic
resurgence be linked. Under the global pandemic, China presented its more effective
governance policies to bring the pandemic under control, and correspondingly, showed a
stronger resistance to the economic crisis caused by COVID-19.
Mask Diplomacy: A New Engagement with the World in the Post-Pandemic
Time
Encountering the COVID-19 crisis, China seeks to cooperate and engage with its
neighbors and the rest of the Western Hemisphere countries through public diplomatic
strategies internationally. With the successful experience in fighting COVID-19 domestically
and abundant medical resources, China is trying to portray itself as a benevolent and
responsible great power leader in the world and shake off its image as the country where the
coronavirus originated. Hence, there is no hesitation that China would catch this precious
opportunity to enhance relations with its Asian neighbors, countries in Europe, and even Latin
America and strengthen its status of great Pacific power in the platform of international politics
on the path to rise peacefully.
What China has done is utilizing so-called "mask diplomacy"—a kind of diplomatic
strategy "for winning hearts and minds" among the rest of the international states (Stojanovic
2020; Verma 2020, 206). As a strategic soft power policy with political messaging and aid
shipments to other countries, mask diplomacy aims to help the states that are still struggling
with the COVID-19 outbreak and establish close economic and political ties with these
countries through China's diplomatic influence. As China shipped mountainous coronavirus
medical aid, including two million surgery masks, respirators and other ICU equipment, gloves,
COVID-19 testing kits, and medicines, to European countries, the aid shipments drew
compliments in most EU countries like Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Slovakia (Stojanovic
2020; Verma 2020, 206-207; Wong 2020). In an article about the impact of China’s medical
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aid towards Chile and other Latin American countries, Prof. Francisco Urdinez (2021)
maintains that mask diplomacy is not a singular exporting approach only directed by the
Chinese central government; instead, he argues that mask diplomacy could be regarded as "a
hodgepodge of actions" by various Chinese donors, such as entrepreneurs and neo-profit
organizations in China, other than "the centralized outgrowth of a unitary national policy"
(Urdinez 2021). Here, this mode of diplomacy launched by China highlights the providential
provision of medical resources and the mobilization of diverse actors (not only the central
government, but provinces, companies, and NGOs, etc.) to provide necessary assistance in
other countries as pivotal means of sympathizing with those traumatized citizens who are still
struggling with the COVID-19 crisis on the other side of the globe and obtaining popular
support for China.
Admittedly, China's mask diplomacy did not always receive praise. On the contrary,
this diplomatic strategy has raised a width of skepticism and critiques from among liberal
Western media outlets regarding China's attempt at "political manipulation," which would
boost China's bargaining chips in the competition of geopolitics with other state powers,
especially the US, and eventually alter the narrative of the COVID-19 (Wong 2020). China
indeed made efforts to rehabilitate its ignominious image in the early stages of the outbreak.
However, these accomplishments contributed by mask diplomacy did secure and stabilize the
medical supply lines of those on the frontiers of fighting COVID-19 in many European
countries, which made a difference to bring the pandemic under control (Wong 2020).
Moreover, China increasingly stresses cooperation with prominent multinational institutions,
especially the World Health Organization (WHO), as a third party to oversee its
implementation of mask diplomacy. Since the spring of 2020, China continued to conform to
norms regarding sharing information, expertise, and equipment in combating COVID-19, and
invited the WHO experts to travel to China for scientific identification of zoonotic sources of
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the SARS-COV-2 virus with Chinese counterparts in July 2020 (WHO 2020; Wong 2020).
Thus, through regional and global engagement in this worldwide public health crisis,
China increased its soft-power attraction through its impressive management of the COVID19 pandemic and mask diplomacy to the rest of the world, especially as we enter the postpandemic period. Even in 2021, China continues to leverage its influence on combating this
public health crisis via "vaccine diplomacy," an extension of mask diplomacy (Karásková and
Blablová 2021). However, vaccine diplomacy is not a "one-way street," which means that
China has to encounter stiff competition from other COVID-19 vaccine producers in the US,
India, or other countries, and overcome the difficulty to qualify the Chinese vaccine to be safe
and effective through of regional and international health authorities, such as European
Medicines Agency (EMA) and the WHO (Huang 2021; Karásková and Blablová 2021).
Nevertheless, from vaccine diplomacy, China has gradually obtained relative advantages via
the massive distribution of Chinese vaccines to especially lower-and middle-income countries
where China might strive to "showcase its global health leadership" (Huang 2021). Overall,
China's pursuit of mask diplomacy and its extension, vaccine diplomacy, aims to establish
long-term patronage relations and networks with the rest of the world as a peaceful and
benevolent figure and as a trustworthy global leader, contributor, and cooperator in
international affairs, especially in the context of the thorny COVID-19 pandemic.

VIII. Conclusion
China's rise is on the way, and it seems to be inevitable due to its consistent economic
growth, more vital military forces, and increasing influence in socioeconomic aspects in the
global environment over decades. However, neo-realists and neo-liberals characterize China's
rise in different ways. As shown above, neo-realists argue that China's rise as a superpower on
the basis of hard power in international politics will be conflictual and based on rivalry because
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of survival concerns from China's neighbors and security competitions between the incumbent
power (US) and the challenger power (China). In contrast to neo-realists' pessimistic
expectations, neo-liberals argue that China will be on track to rise peacefully via its extensive
soft-power strategies, which is more compelling and plausible in the pandemic time.
What many of neo-liberal scholars writing from an American perspective miss is the
soft-power strategies employed by China. As an important source for China's peaceful rise,
these soft-power strategies are theoretically grounded in the idea of harmony and the utilization
of the media as a primary mechanism of communication. By practicing an economic
interdependence doctrine and embracing the idea of harmony, such as the Confucian concept
of xiaokang and datong, China will follow these doctrines to pursue the goals of a "moderately
prosperous society" and "grand utopia of universal brotherhood" as these concepts of harmony
depict. For this reason, China will make its own economic prosperity and development a
priority and engage economically and diplomatically with not only its neighbors but the rest of
the world through continuous economic cooperation and investments. In addition, China's
external propaganda, as well as advocation via mega events, seek to deliver harmonious
cultural discourses and a positive image of China to the world. In a nutshell, based on both neorealist and neo-liberal perspectives, there are inevitable conflicts and rubs throughout the path
of China's rise, but the future process of its rise will tend to be peaceful thanks to China's media
in conveying its harmonious cultures, bolstering economic development, and the CCP's
domestic governance embedded in China's distinct political system.
It is a much more complicated year for great power states globally, as seen in both the
US and China, due to the global pandemic. However, with so many uncertain and unpredictable
factors, this challenging circumstance represents not just danger but also opportunities for these
powerful states in world politics. Under this unprecedented circumstance of a global health
crisis, China has handled the pandemic better due to the Chinese government's competence,
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and therefore this helped China exercise soft-power globally, such as promoting prevailing
mask diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic. For this reason, China might find it
preferable and beneficial to cooperate with other countries in economic and public health
aspects by employing its soft-power attractiveness, such as overseas investments, its successful
COVID-19-fighting experience, and diplomatic policies, to gradually rise as a Pacific
superpower in a peaceful way.
Although China's image on its path of emerging as a superpower is likely to be
harmonious and peaceful, there is still uncertainty for future research of US-China relations.
While compared to China, after the presidential election in the US, President Joe Biden may
re-fortify American alliances in the Western world and the US's connections to international
organizations—he is highly likely to rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris
Agreement—in order to prevent China from emerging as a prevailing regional hegemon
through international cooperation. If that happens, the conflictual tension between these two
nations inevitably will exist and even continue to become much more severe, with a higher
likelihood of war. As current US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, noted in his current
foreign policy remarks, the US-China relationship will be " will competitive when it should be,
collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be" (Blinken 2020). It is interesting
to see how this multidimensional and sophisticated configuration of the great powers will play
out in recent years. Whatever happens, we can be sure that China's soft power and
understanding of harmony will play a role in future relations, both conflictual and cooperative.
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Appendix
Table 1: COVID-19 Management Performance Comparison: China and the United States
China

United States

COVID-19 Confirmed Cases

91,814

13,383,321

Population

1,439,323,774

331,002,647

Cases/Population

0.006%

4.043%

Death Tolls

4,739

266,873

Death Rate (of Population)

0.00033%

0.08063%

(The statistics are updated as of the end of November 2020. Sources from "COVID-19
Situation Update Worldwide." European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control." 2020.
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases.)

Figure 1: Literature Map of China's Rise (Created by Sheldon Xie)
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Figure 2: China's Soft Power Mechanism (Created by Sheldon Xie)

Figure 3: Process of China Leveraging its soft-power influence during the COVID-19
Pandemic Challenge (Created by Sheldon Xie)
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